ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Engineering design is a sequential and iterative process, consisting of five phases: product planning, clarification of task, conceptual design, embodiment design, and detail design [2] .
Decision-based design research recognizes a sequence of decisions in the design process and emphasizes the importance of these decisions to the success of the design [3] [4] [5] . Each decision has two phases-problem formulation and problem solution. Problem formulation consists of identifying design alternatives, states of the world, probabilities of the states, payoffs for each alternative under every state, and criteria for evaluation [6] . Part of the process of identifying the probabilities of the states of the world is a sub-decision problem regarding how much information to collect-the subject of this paper.
Engineers support decision making throughout the design process by expending resources to create, collect, and analyze information. Although this information may provide value to the designers by leading to a better final design, this benefit is uncertain until resources are spent and the information is actually collected. In this paper, we have incorporated the management of this cost-benefit tradeoff into the design decision model. The principles of such information management have been defined as information economics [7] .
In related research, Gupta et al. have demonstrated the importance of incorporating the cost (in terms of number of design alternatives considered) of decision making into the overall design decision model [8] , but they do not provide an approach for estimating the value of information in actual design problems. Radhakrishnan and McAdams consider the cost-benefit trade-offs in selecting models of various levels of abstraction in engineering design [9] . They present a framework in which a designer can reason about model uncertainty, but they admit that the designer is left with little guidance in estimating the actual value of information from different models. Along similar lines, Bradley and Agogino develop a decision-analytic approach to assist designers in cost-benefit analysis of resource expenditures using precisely characterized probability distributions to guide and prioritize information collection [10] , but they do not explain how to estimate these distributions.
In the simulation literature, statistical output analysis is commonly performed to assess whether a sufficient number of simulation replicates have been performed to obtain statistically significant conclusions [11] . However, since the analysis is usually performed based on accuracy requirements, one cannot easily formulate this trade-off with respect to the simulation cost. As in any kind of cost-benefit analysis [12] , a common unit of measure is needed. This need can be met by using the economic value of information [13] . Although the economic value of information is clearly correlated with accuracy, they are not equivalent. For example, when distinguishing between two alternatives that differ significantly in performance, a very accurate and expensive model is less valuable than a simpler model that could have made the same distinction at a much lower cost. Conversely, in high-risk design problems, an expensive model that is more accurate than typically required may lead to a better solution even when factoring in costs, since a simple model may lead to a decision with disastrous consequences.
Howard develops a theory of the value of information which takes into account both probabilistic and economic factors in decisions and uses this theory to determine the optimal number of tests to perform to characterize a known distribution with unknown parameters [14, 15] . Matheson extends Howard's theory and uses it to determine the most economic computations and analyses to perform for a particular decision problem [16] . Although Howard's and Matheson's works are similar in objective to this paper, their approach depends on the designer's ability to accurately assign precise probabilities to the possible states of nature (i.e. having accurate priors) before performing the analysis.
In this paper, we introduce imprecise probabilities, as described by Walley [17] , to extend the applicability of information economics to cases in which probability distributions are not perfectly known to designers-specifically, to the management of statistical data collection in support of engineering design decisions. We present this approach and illustrate how it performs under various conditions in the context of a pressure vessel design example that includes a material strength characterization. This contribution can have a significant impact on engineering design by opening more problem classes to formal cost-benefit analysis during the problem formulation phase and information collection tasks of design decisions. Specifically, a formal cost-benefit analysis could help guide expenditures for information gathering in high-risk designs where difficult-to-characterize, uncommon events with severe consequences play a significant role in decisions.
INFORMATION ECONOMICS
In this section, we introduce the basics of information economics. Economics is the study of choice under conditions of scarcity [18] . Extending this definition, information economics is the study of choice in information collection and management when resources to expend on information are scarce. Because designers face a scarcity of resources, such as time and money, the principles of information economics should be applied to the information collection process in engineering design.
The area of information economics grew out of statistical decision theory in the 1950s when Marschak published a series of papers on the economics of information and organization [7] .
Recently, with the explosion of new information technologies, information economics has regained attention within the broader context of information management. Current areas of research focus on corporate finance and industry policy, such as intellectual property rights, industry regulation, and fostering innovation [19, 20] , or on the infusion of information technology into a corporation [21] . Within engineering, the focus of information management has been primarily on data exchange, interoperability, and visualization to support collaborative design. For an overview of these areas, refer to the following review articles [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] .
In a more general sense, information economics presents principles by which the cost-benefit tradeoffs of information collection can be managed in engineering design. Many of these principles have been developed and employed previously in standard micro-economics and the theory of the economic value of information, pioneered by Marschak [7] and summarized by Lawrence [13] . A substantial difference between engineering design applications and those of Marschak and Lawrence is the availability of perfectly known probability distributionsknowledge that Marschak and Lawrence assume to be available, but engineers often lack in practice. Our goal is to apply information economics directly to the management of information and uncertainty in engineering design.
EXAMPLE PROBLEM
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we discuss the application of information economics in the context of an example of a pressure vessel design. This example has been used previously to demonstrate the value of using imprecise probabilities in engineering design decisions [27] . We now extend this experiment to explore the decision of how much information to collect in order to support design decisions.
In the example problem, a pressure vessel is designed to meet certain requirements while maximizing payoff. The complication is that the pressure vessel is to be built using a material with unknown yield strength. It is assumed that the yield strength is well modeled as a normally distributed random variable, but that the parameters of the normal distribution are unknown.
Yield strength tests can be performed, thus sampling the distribution at a cost c per test.
In this experiment, each yield strength test represents one sample from the true material strength distribution, a normal distribution whose parameters are unknown to the designers. Specifically, the material strength is a random variable X such that:
The mean µ and variance 2 σ are unknown, and the goal of the information collection is to determine these parameters such that a good design decision can be made. The experiment consists of drawing a set of n samples =1 { } n i i x from X . Each sample i x that is drawn from the distribution is a piece of information that can be used to help characterize the true nature of the uncertainty. Unless the designers have infinite resources, they cannot collect the infinite number of samples necessary for a perfect characterization of the distribution. Instead, they need to determine when to stop collecting information-in this case, data samples.
As a designer collects data samples i x , the marginal benefit of an additional sample decreases.
For example, if the designer has only 10 samples, an 11 th sample will usually be quite valuable; in contrast, if the designer has 1000 samples, the 1001 st sample will be considerably less valuable. In this sense, information displays diminishing returns. At some point, the cost of gathering additional information will outweigh the benefit. Thus, the value of a sample is not merely inherent in the sample; rather, the value is measured as viewed from the perspective of the designer. A fundamental principle of information economics is that a decision maker (DM)
should continue to collect information only as long as there is an information source available whose net value is positive. Putting the example problem into more standard micro-economic terms, a rational DM will stop taking data samples at the point where the marginal benefit of the next sample is less than or equal to the marginal cost of acquiring it. A formalization of the basic cost-benefit analysis noted above has been summarized in the context of information by Lawrence [13] . In his work, the measure by which information can be managed is value.
MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM FORMULATION
In engineering design, the value of information can be measured by observing how the information affects the design decision. In this section, we explain the basic principles of information economics and illustrate this framework with a simple example in which precise probability distributions are assumed.
Specifying probabilities over the state space
The set of all possible states of the world form a state space
In the example problem, the state of the world is the actual material strength x of the material used in a particular pressure vessel. The material strength, or state, is assumed to be normally distributed with associated probability density function ( ) p x , with parameters that are unknown to the designer.
The state of the world is outside the DM's control, so the DM can at best estimate the probabilities, thus forming the estimated distribution ( ) p x .
From among the many possible interpretations of probability [17, [28] [29] [30] , we interpret the DM's estimate ( ) p x according to a subjective interpretation of probability. Under a subjective interpretation, probabilities are an expression of belief based on an individual's willingness to bet [28, 29, 31] . We avoid a frequentist interpretation, under which a probability represents the ratio of times that one outcome occurs compared to the total number of outcomes in a series of identical, repeatable, and possibly random trials. While there may be random variables that assume outcomes according to true relative frequencies, we choose the subjective interpretation because the true relative frequencies cannot be determined with any finite number of data samples, and because a subjective interpretation is applicable to a broader class of problems, as it is not limited to repeatable events. Naturally, subjective probabilities should be consistent with available information, including knowledge about observed relative frequencies and the DM's actual beliefs; such probabilities can be considered rationalist subjective probabilities [17] .
The payoff of a decision
For every decision problem, a DM has a set of available actions
{ }
A a = from which to choose one. Once an action has been chosen, the DM will receive a payoff, ( , ) x a π , that depends on the action a chosen and the realized state of the world x . In the example problem, the action a consists of a set of design variables that specify the pressure vessel dimensions. The payoff function used in the example problem, shown in Eq. (2), is highly skewed-the payoff when the vessel fails is largely negative (minus $1 million), yet the payoff when it succeeds is only slightly positive (the selling price of $200 minus the cost of the material used to build the pressure vessel). Skewed payoff functions are common in applications involving risk where rarely occurring events with severe consequences play a significant role in decisions. Note that for a given yield strength and design, the failure cost will either be zero (no failure) or a constant (the cost of the damage, lost productivity, etc. when the pressure vessel fails). 
Direct use of the payoff function in the decision implies that the DM is risk neutral. If the DM is risk-averse or risk-taking, the payoff function should be mapped to a utility function according to this risk attitude. The information economic approach presented in this paper can be used in such situations by performing the same cost-benefit analysis in terms of utilities instead of dollars.
By choosing a precise payoff function, we have assumed perfect models of price, cost, and demand, models that do not typically exist. Imprecise value models could be used; however, this additional imprecision would translate into larger (less precise) bounds on the value of information. We chose a precise value model to limit the number of sources of imprecision to one (the material strength characterization). Limiting the sources of imprecision allows for a clearer presentation of this new approach.
Making an optimal decision
Because of uncertainty in the state of the world x , the DM cannot know the payoff of any action with certainty. We assume that the DM seeks to maximize the expected payoff, given by 
We deviate slightly from standard notation and write
to emphasize that the DM maximizes the expectation, as calculated using his or her subjective probability density function ( ) p x . A similar distinction must be made when determining the payoff of the decision. The true expected payoff is calculated using the true ( ) p x that is unknown to the designer:
The estimated expected payoff according to the designer's subjective distribution is
This payoff * ( ) p x π will in general differ from the true payoff true π . Although Lawrence [13] does not make this distinction in his work, the distinction is crucial in cases in which the designer has only imprecise information about the random distribution.
Information and information sources
The definition of information varies significantly by subject and application. In this paper, we modify Lawrence's definition [13] and define information as any stimulus that changes the recipient's subjective probability distribution ( ) p x over a well-described set of states,
An information source is anything that provides information. This information arrives in the form of a message y taken from the probability distribution of the messages, ( ) p y . In the example problem, the information source is the yield strength testing process, and a message is the result of a single yield strength test-that is, one observation of material strength.
Information economics studies whether it is valuable to pay an information source for a message.
Before the message is received, a DM does not know what information that message contains, and therefore the DM does not know exactly how it will change his or her subjective probability distribution ( ) p x over the state space. In turn, the DM does not know how the message will affect the decision * a and its payoff. Thus, a DM should apply the principles of information economics to arrive at a formal metric for determining if the benefit of a message outweighs the cost of acquiring it-the value of information.
The value of information
We begin by considering two possible decisions: the first decision is made using the current state of information, and the other is made after the receipt of message y. In the first case, assume the DM's subjective probability distribution of the states is represented as ( ) p x . These are the prior probabilities, and the optimal prior decision * 0 a is given by
After the message y is received and incorporated into the DM's knowledge, the DM has an updated posterior probability distribution ( | ) p x y . The corresponding optimal decision * y a is given by
How can we compare these two decisions? If we wait until the true state of the world x is revealed, we can calculate the ex-post gross value of the message y -where gross implies before factoring in cost-for the particular realized state x as:
( )
This represents the amount that the receipt of message y (and the incorporation of its information into the decision) changed the decision maker's payoff, given the particular outcome
x of the state.
The term value is used throughout this paper in a marginal sense, that is, in terms of differences.
The ex-post gross value of a message y is the marginal payoff of acquiring that message-the difference between the payoff of the decision with and without the information from message y . Ling
This gross value can be positive, negative, or zero. It will be positive if the message leads the DM to chose an action * y a that has a higher payoff under realized state x than action * The previously defined ex-post gross value is not useful for determining the potential change in payoff of receiving a message because it measures the actual benefit, which can only be known after the decision is made and the truth realized. It is common knowledge that a good decision can lead to a bad outcome, especially if a rare, adverse state of the world is realized-a situation referred to in the vernacular as bad luck. Conversely, a bad decision can lead to a good outcome-a case of good luck.
Rather than assessing the value of a message for a particular state x , a DM is really interested in the expected value over all the possible states of the world. The gross value of a message y is defined as the expected difference in the payoff with and without the message, such that:
Calculating the true gross value of a message requires the expectation over the true distribution ( ) p x , which is not available to the DM.
To complicate matters further, Eq. (9) is valid for analysis of the value of a particular message y only after it is received. However, when the DM needs to decide whether or not to purchase a message, the content of the message-that is the particular message y from the set Y of all possible messages distributed according to some ( ) p y -is also unknown. When purchasing a message, it is as if the DM is purchasing a sealed envelope; he or she does not know what is inside until after buying and opening the envelope. The DM must therefore consider the value of the information source I instead of the value of a single message.
If the DM had access to the true probability distribution of the messages, ( ) p y , over the set Y , he or she could calculate the gross value of the next message from an information source I :
]
Because the DM does not have access to the parameters describing the true probability distribution of the messages ( ) p y or of the states ( ) p x , Eq. (10) cannot be used directly to estimate the value of an information source. In this paper, we investigate an approach for bounding the value of information that incorporates the imprecision of the DM's information state.
A final definition that ties our notion of value back to the fundamental concept of cost-benefit analysis in information economics is net value. A message y must be purchased at some cost; resources need to be expended in order to acquire more information. Denoting this as cost( ) y , the net value of a message is defined as ( ) ( )
Similarly the net value of the next message from an information source is:
where cost( ) I is the cost of receiving one message y from information source I .
If we revisit the DM's goal of making a cost-benefit tradeoff during information collection, we can now state the information economic principle that a designer should purchase a message from an information source if the net value of that information is positive. According to Eq. (12) , this requires the calculation of expectations across the distributions ( ) p x and ( ) p y , which in general are not known to a designer. We will return to the problem of not knowing ( ) p x and ( ) p y after illustrating the simpler case of known probabilities.
Example with known probabilities
In this section, we present an example to illustrate the calculation of value of information in the hypothetical case of known probabilities. We later extend this example to the more practical case of unknown probability parameters. While the information used in this example is not available to a DM, it is useful for illustrating the basic approach, shown in Fig. 1 .
We assume that there is an omniscient supervisor overseeing the experiment. This supervisor knows the true distribution and can perform the actions shown in the gray boxes. These actions are normally not available to the DM. In this approach, the DM begins with the observed set of
The goal is to determine whether it is valuable to collect an ( 1) st n + sample given the existing n samples. The DM first uses this set of samples to construct a best-fit distribution ( ) calculating the value of an additional sample is repeated over many j y to calculate the average value of the next sample for a particular starting set of n samples, which we will denote as Recall that the net value of the next piece of information depends on the prior decision * 0 a , which in turn depends on the existing data samples. For example, the net value of purchasing an 11 th sample from the information source will depend on the first 10 samples. If the initial 10 samples just happen-by chance-to yield very good estimates of the distribution parameters, then the net value of the 11 th sample will be small, but if they yield bad estimates of the distribution parameters, then the net value of the 11 th sample could be large. Consequently, the next step is to repeat the experiment over many initial sample sets Σ, which gives the average gross value of the next sample, denoted ( 1) V n + .
The final step of the experiment is to repeat the process for different initial sample sizes. By repeating the calculation over many initial sample sizes, we can construct a curve of the average net value of an additional sample at different sample sizes, as shown in Fig. 2 . This figure can be interpreted as follows: at a prior sample size n =32, the average net value of an additional sample (the 33 rd sample in this case), is about $2. The net value of the 52 nd sample, starting from 51 samples, is negative, but the net value of the 51 st sample is positive. This means that the 52 nd sample is the first sample whose average net value is negative; therefore, by stopping at 51
samples the designer will achieve the highest expected utility. Note that this conclusion is drawn using the true ( ) p y and ( ) p x , which are not available to the DM. The results can also be interpreted by considering the net expected payoff, which is the payoff of the design that would have been realized if no additional information were collected, less the cost of the already collected n samples:
The results are shown for different sample sizes in Fig. 3 . Again, because the actual observed samples affect the payoff, the payoff of the design is averaged over many initial sample sets.
The relationship between this result and the net value of additional samples should be clear; the maximum net expected payoff occurs at the same sample size at which the net value of an additional sample first becomes negative. Recalling that the net value is defined in a marginal sense, moving from 51 samples to 52 samples means a decrease in total payoff of the decision, as is revealed in both plots. To determine the value of information during the actual design process, the DM needs a method by which he or she can estimate the net value of an additional data sample when the parameters describing ( ) p y and ( ) p x are unknown. We propose an approach that uses imprecise probabilities to calculate an interval of net value for an additional sample.
What performance characteristics should we expect or demand of this approach? Insight can be gained by examining the distribution of the net payoffs about the expected value curve of Fig. 3 .
Box plots for sample sizes of 50, 100, and 150 are shown in Fig. 4 . The plots are constructed with the whiskers at the 0.1% and 99.9% quantiles, and the boxes from 25% to 75%. The extreme skewness of the box-plots is due to the skewed payoff function; that is, the cost of slightly under designing the pressure vessel is large compared to the cost of slightly over designing it. The box plots reveal that both the variance of the payoff and the chance of a catastrophic result decrease as the sample size increases but that, simultaneously, the expected net value decreases significantly. The behavior shown in Fig. 4 suggests that a reasonable estimation of the optimal number of samples (when the DM has only imprecise knowledge about the true distribution) will often be well beyond 51 (the optimal stopping point based on expected value), because by stopping at 51 samples, a DM still faces a very large downside risk. It is important to consider the distributions in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 when developing an approach for determining the value of additional samples; however, in practice, an engineer will not have this information available for decision making. We return to this issue after introducing the concept of imprecise probabilities. 
IMPRECISE PROBABILITIES
Imprecise probabilities have been formalized by Walley [17] , and the value of using imprecise probabilities in certain engineering design decisions has been demonstrated previously [27] . We extend this work to estimate the value of information through the application of information economics and imprecise probabilities. Other common representations of imprecision of probabilities can be found in the multi-attribute decision-making literature including ordinal ranking of probabilities [32, 33] and probabilities subject to linear constraints [34] .
Under a subjective interpretation, a probability represents an individual's willingness to enter a bet. Every bet has a price associated with it, and one can either buy or sell a bet at that price.
The use of precise probabilities presumes that a DM can determine exactly the price at which he or she is indifferent between buying and selling the bet, the DM's so-called fair price [35] . The use of imprecise probabilities allows for a range of prices at which a DM would neither buy nor sell the bet, because he or she is not sure how betting at these prices will affect his or her expected payoff.
Imprecise probabilities can be reduced to precise probabilities in theory by collecting infinite evidence and expending infinite effort to elicit the DM's beliefs. In this example problem, we are explicitly assuming a finite amount of evidence (in the form of data samples), such that precise probabilities are unattainable. We therefore use imprecise probabilities to capture the DM's current state of information, which in the example corresponds to his or her probability assessments.
We use a probability-box or p-box [36] , to represent imprecise cumulative probability distributions. A p-box incorporates both imprecision and probabilistic characterizations by expressing interval bounds on the cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) for a random variable. More formally, the bounds on a p-box, such as shown in Fig. 5(a 
[ ]
By choosing a particular confidence level for the mean and variance intervals, a DM is essentially stating that he or she is comfortable assuming that the true distribution lies entirely in the resultant p-box. This assumption is similar to accepting the p-box as a model of the truth.
This distinction becomes important in our approach for estimating the value of information, as explained in the following section.
ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF INFORMATION
In this section, we explain our approach to bounding the gross value of the next message from an information source. We start by describing how design decisions are made. We then motivate the use of imprecise probabilities, describe our approach of estimating the value of information, and present a computational experiment that illustrates the results of our approach.
Design decision policy
According to Eq. (3), the DM chooses the design action that maximizes the expected payoff, with the expectation calculated using ( ) p x . This distribution is derived by assuming that the material strength is normally distributed and then using the sample mean and sample variance of the observed samples as precise estimates of the true mean and variance. Other work has presented a decision policy that incorporates imprecision into ( ) p x during the solution phase of the design decision [27] , much as the approach in this paper incorporates imprecision into the problem formulation phase. Nevertheless, for this paper a decision policy based on a best-fit distribution is used in the problem solution phase in order to isolate the effect of accounting for imprecision in the problem formulation phase-that is, to emphasize the contributions of applying information economics. A noted item for future work is the combination of these approaches into one unified approach that explicitly considers imprecision throughout the design process.
Motivation for imprecise probabilities
One motivation for using imprecise probabilities to represent the DM's state of information is that the use of precise probabilities does not enable useful estimates of value. The necessity of an alternative to precise probabilities is illustrated in the following example. Assume that the DM represents his or her state of information ( ) or, by distributing the expectation as:
According to Eq. (6), the design decision * 0 a maximizes ( ) 
This means that the gross value of message y is always estimated to be zero or negative, no matter how much new information is available. Yet intuitively, the gross value of additional information should often be positive-acquiring information should improve the DM's ability to make a good decision on average.
If the DM instead used the posterior distribution ( ) | p x y , we can rewrite Eq. (9) as: 
Expanding the expectation, we find 
In this case, the gross value is always calculated to be positive or zero, which is also unreasonable; there will always be "unlucky" samples, or messages, that lead to a worse design.
Another objection to using the precise ( ) | p x y is that it has no use in decision making, because ( ) | p x y is only available after the information message y is collected.
This exercise illustrates that an information collection policy based upon the assumption of precisely characterized knowledge about the true distributions is not useful. The principles of information economics cannot be applied meaningfully while using precise probabilities, but they can be implemented using an approach based on imprecise probabilities that provides useful bounds on the value of information, as described in the next section.
Bounding the value of information
An overview of our approach is shown in Fig. 6 . The DM begins with the actually observed set of data samples source is an unbiased model of the truth in the example problem, these two distributions are identical; they both describe the unknown true material strength. This selected distribution is used to estimate the gross value of collecting an additional piece of information through the use of Eq. (10) The DM can partition the p-box into a finite, representative set of distributions. This is done by discretizing the confidence intervals on the mean and variance. The DM pairs all the combinations of mean and variance, resulting in a set of distributions such as shown in Fig. 7 .
Future work will explore more efficient methods for this partitioning such as concepts from design of experiments, direct manipulation of the p-boxes, or random sampling across the confidence intervals; for illustration of the concept this method suffices. used in the analysis will be different for this new data set.
COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT
We will now apply the principles of information economics to the design of a pressure vessel.
The experiment proceeds according to the approach shown in Fig. 6 and is repeated for sample sizes up to 200. This generates intervals on the gross value for one particular sequence of random samples { } i x . This experiment is then repeated many times to generate multiple sample traces.
RESULTS
Using the approach and experiment described above, we can find the bounds on the gross value of the next piece of information, ( 1) V n + . A graph of these bounds for a particular sequence of
x -a particular sample trace-is shown in Fig. 8 . A trace represents the bounds on the gross value of the th n sample, given a particular set of 1 n − previously observed samples Figure 9 shows the upper-bound, lower-bound, and midpoint for two additional traces in Ling the vicinity of their crossing of the cost line-the zero net value point. The curves in the two figures reveal several interesting characteristics, as discussed in the following sections. Figure 8 shows that the potential value of the next sample for small sample sizes covers a very large range that is skewed towards the positive side. For example, the gross value of the 17 th sample is in the interval [-10, 880] . Based on traditional decision policies, an interval bounding zero leads to indeterminacy. Since a decision must be made, a decision policy that can resolve this ambiguity is required. We assume one extreme-the DM stops collecting data when the upper-bound on the gross value is less than the cost-that is, when the upper-bound on the net value is negative. At the accepted confidence level, the true value is assumed to lie in the interval, so this represents the point at which the true net value cannot exceed zero, therefore, no rational DM would take an additional sample. This is a so-called Γ-maximax policy [38, 39] .
Other possible policies for managing interval-based decisions include maximality [17] , Γ-maximin [38] , E-admissibility [39] , and the Hurwicz criterion [40] .
The bounds on value are not monotonic
In a general sense, it is reasonable to expect that the value of additional samples would decrease as n increases. However, each trace represents one sequence of actually observed samples.
Thus, the gross value of the th i sample is estimated based on the first 1 i − samples. Once the th i sample is collected, the value of the ( 1) st i + sample is calculated using all i acquired samples. If the actually acquired th i sample is really "lucky" or "unlucky", the gross value of the next sample can change significantly, potentially yielding non-monotonic bounds. An example of such non-monotonicity is labeled in Fig. 9 . Non-monotonicity can result in multiple cost line crossings, but these crossings were never observed to be more than a few sample sizes apart.
Because the bounds are already estimates, a deviation of a few samples is not significant.
The lower-bound is always non-positive
It is worth noting that the lower-bound on the interval will always be non-positive, i.e., given the available information, it is always possible that the gross value of the next piece of information will be less than zero. This happens because the best-fit distribution ( ) p x on which the design decision is based is always contained in the set of distribution samples from the p-box-it is a candidate for the truth in our approach. This means that during the calculation of the interval on gross value, this distribution will be considered as the truth at some point, yielding the situation described in Eq. (16)-if the DM's estimate already is the true distribution, which is possible though rare, then no information can make the estimate any better; it will in fact often make the estimate worse.
Examining the net value
The next point to note is the relationship between the gross value and cost. In practice, there is a relationship between the number of pressure vessels being designed and the cost, because the cost of information collection is amortized over all the pressure vessels. In this example, we assume that each yield strength test on a material sample costs $0.50 per pressure vessel, and we proceed to discuss the design of one pressure vessel. Other cost functions could be used without adding significant complexity. With the cost fixed at $0.50, an experiment following Trace A and using the upper-bound decision rule will stop with the 147 th sample, because the upperbound on the gross value of the 148 th sample is less than the cost, as can be seen in Fig. 9 . The same logic can be applied to Trace B. In this case, a DM would collect 162 samples. At this point, the upper-bound on the gross value of the 163 rd sample is less than the cost, so the net value is negative.
In this section, we have presented two representative results. The overall results consist of many sample traces that can be analyzed in the same way as the examples above.
DISCUSSION
With representative results presented in the previous section, we now move to a more general discussion. We examine the realized payoffs based on the described approach and discuss alternative decision policies for resolving ambiguity.
Comparison of realized payoffs
Using the true material strength distribution ( ) p x -which is not known by the designers-an omniscient supervisor could evaluate Eq. would have been much worse to stop after 80 samples as compared to 100. According to Fig. 9 , the midpoint stopping rule would have stopped at 124 samples for this trace. While this is still about 50% below the optimal, it yields a significantly better result than a policy that would have stopped at 80 samples.
Before ending this analysis, we present one last trace in Fig. 12 . For this trace, the optimal stopping point would have been at 110 samples. In this case, the solution using the midpoint stopping rule of 130 samples is relatively close, though still resulting in some payoff loss. What causes the optimal stopping point to be so high in this case? One contributing factor is that the first five actual samples were 192 MPa, 200 MPa, 194 MPa, 197 MPa, and 181 MPa. These are all above the true mean of 180 MPa. This initial "unlucky" bias leads to a severe over-estimate of the material strength, which in turn leads to a severe under-design of the pressure vessel.
Consequently, the pressure vessel fails much more often than expected, leading to a significantly higher average failure cost. This example indicates how sensitive the design can be to the sample data, and why a large number of samples may be needed to reach a stable result.
Before reaching a conclusion on the effectiveness of this approach of bounding the value of information, we must emphasize that the DM would not have the actual expected payoff curves available. Therefore, the DM does not know if he or she is in an example similar to that of Fig.   10 , Fig. 11, Fig. 12 , or something else altogether. A conservative policy therefore leads the designer to keep taking samples until he or she is reasonably assured that there is no chance of a large negative payoff; that is, samples are taken until the downside risk is acceptable.
FUTURE WORK
This paper lays a foundation for applying information economics to engineering design decisions involving the collection of information about probability distributions with unknown parameters, but there is still significant room for improvement and additional exploration.
Decision policies for gathering information. In this paper, we have presented an approach for bounding the value of collecting additional data samples. These bounds need to be resolved according to some policy in order to make a decision. Given just the bounds, any policy that selects a point between the bounds is rational, because the true value is only known to be somewhere between them.
For certain problems, a particular policy may tend to work better. For example, we loosely compare the Γ-maximax and midpoint policies for the pressure vessel design example and find that the midpoint policy almost always performs better. If such results could be generalized to specific sets of problems, then designers might be able to choose an appropriate decision policy based on meta-information about the design problem. This would greatly increase the impact of the approach for bounding the value of information presented in this paper. Whether such generalizations are possible is an open research question.
Design decision policies.
As mentioned in the Estimating the Value of Information section, we chose a design decision policy based on precise probabilities (the best-fit normal distribution) so that we could focus on the effectiveness of using imprecise probabilities to represent the DM's state of information and using this imprecise representation to estimate the value of information.
Previous work has shown the value of incorporating the imprecision of the DM's state of information directly into the design decision policy [27] . The use of imprecise probabilities for both the design decision policy and the prediction of the value of information appears to be a more realistic representation of a typical design problem and could possibly lead to additional insight.
P-box construction. When constructing p-boxes, it would be impractical to use 100% confidence intervals, since these would be infinite. For this experiment, we construct p-boxes using 95% confidence intervals on the mean and variance and assume that they contain the truth [1] . It is possible to create p-boxes based on weaker assumptions using alternative methods for p-box construction [37] . Similar to the decision policy work noted above, different p-box construction policies may work better for different design problems. Any such relationships need to be explored before this approach can be put to practical use.
Unknown Distributions. The p-box can be used to represent the DM's lack of knowledge about a distribution when the DM has varying amounts of initial knowledge about the distribution [37] .
In this paper, we investigated how our approach performs when the DM knows the type of distribution but has no knowledge about the values of the distribution's parameters. Other possible cases include when the DM can specify a set of all possible distribution types or when the DM lacks any knowledge about the possible distribution types. In both cases, the p-box would be significantly broader resulting in wider value bounds. The applicability of our approach could be expanded to other classes of problems by investigating how it performs under varying amounts of initial knowledge about the distribution being characterized.
Computational cost. The approach presented in this paper requires a double-loop Monte Carlo simulation for every sample size. For this experiment, the calculation of bounds on the value of the next sample takes about 5 minutes with a high number of p-box and message samples, though results for runs as short as 30 seconds appear nearly as good. These times are on a single 2.6 GHz Pentium 4 processor system with 512 MB of RAM. Although this computation time seems perfectly reasonable, the computational complexity can be expected to increase substantially for more complicated design problems; hence, the authors recognize that the proposed approach will need to be modified for application to complex design problems. For example, some p-box computations can be performed using algorithms with foundations in interval analysis that do not require second order Monte Carlo techniques [37, 41] and are consequently much less computationally expensive on average [42] . Future work investigating how to adapt these methods for computing and simulating directly with p-boxes such that they can be used in the proposed approach is needed.
Design problems. The pressure vessel example used in this paper is deliberately simple, in order to illustrate concisely the information economic framework for information collection in design.
To assess the general applicability of our approach, several variations of the design problem should be investigated. First, the material choice and hence the true distribution being characterized could be varied. Second, the payoff function could be varied to consider different levels of risk-preference. Third, a design problem in which there are multiple uncertain parameters and multiple sources of information could be explored. Modifications in the computational methods, as mentioned in the computational cost section, as well as possible modifications to the approach itself may be required in order to apply this approach in a computationally feasible manner to complex engineering design problems. These three design problem variations could lead to more general conclusions about the applicability of the approach.
SUMMARY
In this paper, we have introduced the principles of information economics and related them to engineering design problems in which statistical parameters describing distributions are not fully known. The main contribution of this work is the investigation of an approach by which the bounds on the value of information can be calculated by a designer during the information collection process using imprecise probabilities. An open question is how to make a decision given these bounds on value. We have presented the approach, explored several example situations and decision policies, described the limitations, and identified areas for future work. Ling 
